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REVIEW ESSAY, THE MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
by James H. Stark*
Lawyers discovered ethics during the 1970's. Or at least so it
seems. Since the promulgation in January 1970 of the ABA Model
Code of Professional Responsibility [the Code],' there has been an
explosion of interest in the subject of legal ethics. The number of
articles and casebooks written on the subject has increased dra-
matically.2 Disdaining the so-called "pervasive" method of teaching
ethics, American law schools have introduced a half-generation of law
students to the subject in discrete and often required courses. 3 Legal
ethics is now covered on most state bar examinations.4 Enforcement
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Connecticut. I would like to express grati-
tude to my colleagues Richard Kay, Tom Morawetz and Bruce Mann for their helpful and
supportive comments on earlier drafts of this essay.
1. The Code of Professional Responsibility was adopted by the House of Delegates
of the American Bar Association on August 12, 1969 to become effective for ABA mem-
bers on January 1, 1970. Since its effective date, it has been in a virtually continual state
of revision, having been amended seven times-February 1970, February 1974, Febru-
ary 1975, February 1976, August 1977, August 1978, and February 1979.
2. In the past decade alone nine new casebooks have been published. See R.
ARONSON, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1977); L. BROWN & E.
DAUER, PLANNING BY LAWYERS (1978); A. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY (1976); D. MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER (1973); D.
MELLINKOFF, LAWYERS AND THE SYSTEM OF JUSTICE (1976); T. MORGAN & R. RO-
TUNDA, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1976); L.
PATTERSON & E. CHEATHAM, THE PROFESSION OF LAW (1971); N. REDLICH, PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: A PROBLEM APPROACH (1977); S. THURMAN, E. PHILLIPS & E.
CHEATHAM, CASES ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1979). For the three year period for
1964-67, the Index of Legal Periodicals lists 97 entries under the title "Legal Ethics."
The index for the period 1973-76 lists 158 entries.
3. Monroe Freedman and Andrew Kaufman, two leading commentators in the field
of legal ethics, like to joke about the "pervasive" method, saying that they learned
about professional responsibility the same way,-in practice, having heard nothing
whatever about the subject in law school. See Foreword to R. ARONSON, PROBLEMS IN
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY at xv (1977). By contrast, a recent survey of 163 law
schools revealed that all of them now offer courses in professional responsibility and
that 85% of them require these courses for graduation. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON TEACHING PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 21-24, 30, 33 (P. Keenan ed. 1979).
4. NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON TEACHING PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 48-49 (P.
Keenan ed. 1979).
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mechanisms, reported to be in a "scandalous" state in 1970,5 have
been revitalized as a consequence of increased budgets and greater
public attention. 6 Significant legal ethics questions are now regularly
addressed by our highest courts, as groups and individuals challenge
some of the profession's most established tenets. 7
No one factor has been responsible for this extraordinary activity.
But to a significant extent, the Code has itself been a catalyst. To a
much greater extent than its genteel and hortatory predecessor, the
Canons of Ethics, the Code is a formal regulator), document, suscep-
tible to systematic analysis, interpretation and enforcement. To be
sure, the Code has been roundly criticized since its adoption. 8 It has
been observed, for example, that the Code is too much concerned
with issues of manners, etiquette and self-service, according equally
prominent status, and significantly greater space, to rules limiting ad-
vertising, solicitation and unauthorized practice and to the rules
defining the basic fiduciary obligations of a law yer;9 that it focuses too
much on sole practitioners, in particular, trial law-yers serving individ-
ual clients, neglecting other lawyering roles and other ethical issues
which arise when lawyers work in groups or serve large institutions;10
5. See ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT,
PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (1970).
6. See generally Steele & Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients and Professional Regulation,
1976 Ai. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 917 [hereinafter cited as Steele & Nimmer];
Marks & Cathcart, Discipline Within the Legal Profession: Is It Self-Regulation?, 1974
U. ILL. L.F. 193 (1974).
7. See, e.g., In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (public interest solicitation); Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (commercial solicitation); Bates v. State Bar of
Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (advertising); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773
(1975) (minimum fee schedules). See also People v. Beige, 50 App. Div. 2d 105, 376
N.Y.S.2d 771 (1975), aff-d, 41 N.Y.2d 60, 359 N.E.2d 377, 390 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1976)
(lawyer-client confidentiality).
8. See, e.g., Aronson, Professional Responsibility: Education and Enforcement, 51
VASH. L. REv. 273 (1976); Brown, ABA Code of Professional Responsibility: In Defense
of Mediocrity, 16 CATH. LAWV. 314 (1970); Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Profes-
sional Responsibility, 90 HARv. L. REv. 702 (1977); Patterson, Wanted: A New Code of
Professional Responsibility, 63 A.B.A.J. 639 (1977); Comment, The Failure of Situation-
Oriented Professional Rules to Guide Conduct: Conflicting Responsibilities of the
Criminal Defense Attorney Whose Client Commits or Intends to Commit Perjury, 55
WASH. L. REV. 211 (1979); Comment, Legal Ethics and Professionalism, 79 YALE l.
1179 (1970).
9. G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 68-106. 213-14, 22.23 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as HAZARD]. Another useful critique of the Code's inverted priorities
is Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HAnv. L. REv. 702
(1977).
10. This is a central theme of Professor Hazard's book. See HAZARD supra note 9. at
7, 150-51. See also Patterson, A Preliminary Rationalization of the Law of Ethics, 57
1980]
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and, perhaps most critical of all, that the Code is an ambiguous
patchwork rife with inconsistencies and obscure footnotes, resolving
few of the difficult questions which actually arise in practice.11 But it
is the range and diversity of criticism which seem more striking than
the validity or persuasiveness of any particular view. As the profes-
sion's first attempt to prescribe a body of enforceable regulations re-
specting a broad and inevitably controversial subject matter, the
Code has fostered a re-examination of some fundamental issues per-
taining to the adversary system.
Now comes a proposal for an entirely new code, the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct [the Rules]. Drafted by the ABA Com-
mission on Evaluation of Professional Standards,1 2 the Rules were
published on January 30, 1980 in discussion draft form. The drafting
commission has invited written comments from the bar and the pub-
lic and has scheduled a series of public hearings during 1980 at which
interested persons are invited to express their views. A "final" ver-
N.C. L. REV. 519 (1979). Ironically, the Code was intended to address this problem. In
1966, John F. Sutton, the Reporter for the ABA Special Committee on Evolution of Eth-
ical Standards (which drafted the Code) told the New York City Bar Association that the
Canons of Ethics have been "often criticized-and I think justly so, for [their] great at-
tention to the work of trial lawyers and [their] neglect of other areas," like those related
to the work of the corporate lawyer. Sutton, Revision of the Canons of Ethics of the
American Bar Association, 21 REC. A.B. N.Y.C. 472 (1966).
11. See, e.g., Aronson, Professional Responsibility: Education and Enforcement, 51
WASH. L. REV. 273 (1976); Comment, The Failure of Situation-Oriented Professional
Rules To Guide Conduct: Conflicting Responsibilities of the Criminal Defense Attorney
Whose Client Commits or Intends to Commit Perjury, 55 WASH. L. REV. 211 (1979).
12. The Commission is comprised of lawyers and non-lawyers, critics, and estab-
lished members of the organized Bar. Its members are: Robert J. Kutak (chairman), a
private practitioner in Omaha and a member of the Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility; Samuel D. Thurman, a law professor at the University of
Utah; Thomas Ehrlich, former Dean of Stanford Law School and president of the Legal
Services Corporation; Marvin Frankel, a former United States District Court Judge, now
in private practice; Robert McKay, formerly Dean of N.Y.U. Law School, now president
of the Aspen Institute; Arno Denecke, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Oregon;
Jane Lakes Frank, Chief Counsel to the United States Senate Constitutional Rights
Committee and a critic of the ABA; Lois Harrison, public member and past president of
the Florida League of Women Voters; Robert O. Hetlage, a private practitioner in St. Louis,
Missouri, and past president of the Missouri State Bar Association; Robert Meserve,
a private practitioner in Boston and formerly president of the ABA, and Richard H.
Sinkfield, a private practitioner in Atlanta. William Spann apparently joined the Com-
mission at some point during its tenure; his name is now listed as a member of the
Committee. Alan Barth, an author, non-lawyer, and civil libertarian, served on the Com-
mission until his death in 1979. The reporter to the Commission was Geoffrey Hazard, a
Professor of Law at Yale. Those who are familiar with Hazard's thoughtful and beauti-
fully written monograph, Ethics in the Practice of Law (1978) will recognize many of
the themes of the Model Rules as derivations of that work.
[Vol. 12:9-18
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sion of the Rules will not be submitted for vote to the ABA House of
Delegates until February 1981. Yet even given their tentative pos-
ture, one may observe that these Model Rules are not in any sense a
series of amendments to the existing Code. They are, as their preface
states, a "comprehensive reformulation '" 3 of the rules now in force-
an entirely new document.
The Rules have been in the making for two and one-half years.
The drafting Commission was formed in August 1977 by William B.
Spann as one of his first acts as president of the ABA. Spann ex-
pressly charged the Commission with the task of drafting a new code.
His judgment apparently was that no series of amendments could res-
cue the existing Code from its essentially flawed structure.14 Many of
the Rules' provisions, indeed its basic structural revisions, can be
seen as a direct response to criticisms of the Code. The Rules' fram-
ers have wholly abandoned the Code's organization, redrafted most of
its language, identified some significant new ethical problems and
utilized an entirely different manner of regulation. The Rules give
principal emphasis to fiduciary questions arising in the lawyer-client
relationship, rather than to other, more peripheral matters. 15 The re-
drafted language resolves many of the ambiguities and inconsistencies
of its predecessor' 6 and identifies new issues in a generally helpful
manner. '
7
Nevertheless, the Model Rules resist easy labelling. Technically,
they are well-drafted; but the fact that they more clearly define and
resolve ethical issues may, as I shall discuss, render certain sections
unpalatable to the profession as a whole. For the most part, they are
"client-centered," concerned to a greater extent than the Code with
improving the availability and quality of legal services to the public.
Yet at the same time they define far more stringent limits on what an
13. Preface to MODEL RULES OF PRoFESsIONAL CoNDUcT at i (Discussion Draft
1980).
14. LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR 213, 217 (1978) [hereinafter cited as LIEBER-
MAN].
15. For example, the unauthorized practice of law rule is carried forward from the
Code, but is buried at the end of the Rules in Rule 10A(e)-a subprovision entitled
"Misconduct." For a discussion of the new organization of the Rules and their impact
on the document as a whole, see notes 23-63 infra and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., notes 43-48 infra and accompanying text.
17. For example, the Rules analyze the counselling obligations of a lawyer with a
mentally disabled or infant client (Rule 1.14); the ethical relationship and responsibili-
ties of supervisory and subordinate lawyers (Rules 7.1 and 7.2); and the ethical respon-
sibilities of the lobbyist (Rule 3.12). For an extended discussion of newly identified
lawyer roles, see footnotes 32-42 infra and accompanying text.
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attorney may properly do for a client and on the scope of attorney-
client confidentiality. Finally, the Rules as a whole cannot easily be
characterized as "liberal" or "conservative." Some Rules provisions
carry forward Code sections in substantially unchanged form; others
reflect clear judicial developments during the past decade; still others
modify or alter existing ethical standards where judicial developments
have been inconsistent or unclear.
In explaining its perception that a "comprehensive reform-
ulation" of the old Code is in order, the Commission speaks of a
"continuing evolution in ethical thought that has characterized much
of the professional debate of the 1970's."18 There is indeed much that
is "evolutionary" in the Rules: the substantially liberalized provisions
pertaining to advertising and solicitation;1 9 the newly drafted provi-
sions pertaining to the quality of lawyers' performance, creating for
the first time duties of "diligence," "promptness" and "adequate at-
tention";20 the redrafted sections governing conflicts of interest,21 and
18. Preface to MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT at i (Discussion Draft
1980) (emphasis added). I was struck by the use of the term "evolutionary." Webster's
Third New International Dictionary provides two preferred definitions of "evolution":
"A series of related changes in a certain direction," and "a process of continuous change
from a lower, simpler or worse condition to a higher, more complex or better state."
19. The Rules' advertising provisions would permit all advertisements (through all
media including television) except those containing "false, fraudulent or misleading
statement[s] about the lawyer or the lawyer's services .. ." See Rules 9.1 & 9.2. The so-
licitation section would allow direct mail solicitation, for commercial purposes, of a pro-
spective client, unless:
(1) The lawyer reasonably should know that the physical, emotional, or mental
state of the person solicited is such that the person could not exercise rea-
sonable judgment in employing a lawyer;
(2) The person solicited has made known a desire not to receive communica-
tions from the lawyer;
(3) The solicitation involves coercion, duress, or harassment.
Rule 9.3(a)(1-3).
These advertising and solicitation provisions can be seen as evolving directly from
the language and spirit, if not the actual holdings, of Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S.
350 (1977) and Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) respectively.
20. Rules 1.5, 1.2, 1.4. See also 1.6(b) (requiring lawyers to reduce fee agreements to
writing). These sections and others pertaining to the adequacy of lawyers' performance
are a direct outgrowth of recent empirical research identifying the more frequent com-
plaints that clients lodge against attorneys. Recurring problems include fee disputes, al-
legations of delay, neglect, breakdowns of communication between lawyer and client
and inadequate or negligent performance. See generally Steele & Nimmer, supra note 6,
at 946-64.
21. Conflict of interest questions are frequently addressed by courts in the course of
ruling on motions to disqualify counsel. Thus, more than other legal ethics subjects, con-
flict of interest has acquired a substantial judicial gloss. On issues such as "vicarious
disqualification," where the absolute prohibition against a partner or associate of a
[Vol. 12:9,18
REVIEW ESSAY
more. These provisions will undoubtedly receive substantial attention
as the Rules are disseminated for comment and discussion.
At the risk of a slightly imbalanced presentation, I choose to em-
phasize the last categories of rules-the rules which, in the words of
the Commission, "[push] beyond the Code's foundation"22-but with-
out firm judicial support. In particular, I shall focus upon the rules
governing the adversary function. It is questionable whether these
rules are "evolutionary" in any sense. To the extent that they are not,
they raise the most interesting and difficult questions both about the
Rules in particular and about the purposes of and justifications for
formal ethics codes in general.
I. ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE
Understanding the Rules' organization and structure is essential
to an appreciation of its substantive provisions. Two fundamental
changes are striking. First, the Code's division of the total corpus of
professional rules into component duties, as embodied in the nine
Canons, has been abandoned. While this organization has been help-
ful in delineating the conflicting role obligations which a lawyer may
encounter in practice to the court, to the client, to society, etc., it
has been, as I shall discuss, less helpful in resolving these conflicts.
Second, the Rules have wholly discarded the Code's formal distinc-
tion between nonenforceable, "aspirational" objectives, Ethical Con-
siderations, and mandatory, enforceable prescriptions, Disciplinary
Rules. The result is a document which is more rule-conscious and
consequently less flexible in its approach.
Compared to the rococo style of the Code, the Model Rules'
structure is remarkably simple. The Rules are divided into two basic
parts. Part A, "The Practice of Law," describes the incidents of the
lawyer-client relationship-the fiduciary responsibilities of the lawyer
and the limitations on what a lawyer may properly do for a client.
These rules constitute the bulk of the document, forty-six out of a to-
tal of fifty-seven rules. Part B, "The Responsibilities of a Public Pro-
fession," primarily addresses questions regarding legal service deliv-
ery-pro bono representation, solicitation, advertising, etc.
disqualified lawyer representing a client has been substantially relaxed, judicial trends
have been fairly clear. The Rules capture these evolutionary developments. See, e.g.,
Rule 7.1. For a useful review of recent conflict of interest caselaw developments, see
Aronson, Conflict of Interest, 52 WASH. L. REv. 807 (1977).
22. Preface to MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr at i (Discussion Draft
1980).
1980]
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Part A of the Rules consists of seven sections. The first section,
the "Client-Lawyer Relationship"23 lists sixteen separate rules. Many
are familiar: for example, the basic provisions pertaining to conflict of
interest,24 safekeeping property, 25 the duty of competence, 26 and
withdrawal from representation 27 are carried forward from the Code
in substantially unchanged form. Others, including broad duties of
"prompt attention," 28 "adequate communication," 29 "diligence," 30 and
the specific duty to reduce fee agreements to writing, 31 are entirely
new. Again, for my purposes, these new fiduciary obligations, while
an essential theme of the Rules, will not receive primary attention.
A. The Development of "Role-Rules"
Significant changes are embodied in sections two through six of
Part A of the Rules. These sections are role-oriented: they prescribe
rules which focus upon and subject to regulation specific tasks prac-
ticing lawyers are called upon to perform. The Committee has
identified six discrete lawyering roles: advocate, 32 lobbyist,33 ad-
23. In choosing the title "client-lawyer relationship" (rather than "lawyer-client" re-
lationship), the Rules' drafters did not reverse nouns unintentionally. The Rules assume
that the client should be the principal decisionmaker in the relationship, adopting a
"participatory" model of the counselling process. See, e.g., Rule 1.3 (client autonomy),
Rule 1.4 (adequate communication), Rule 4.1 [disclosure to a client (as to negotiation)].
See also D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER-CLIENT, WHO'S IN CHARGE? (1974); Patterson,
Wanted: A New Code of Professional Responsibility, 63 A.B.A.J. 639, 642 (1977) ("Con-
trary to the common notion, the fundamental relationship in legal ethics is not the
attorney-client relationship, but the client-attorney relationship, for the client is what
standards are all about.") For a view that the allocation of responsibility for decision-
making between lawyer and client is unclear under the Code, see Spiegel, Lawyer and
Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REv.
41 (1979).
24. Compare Rules 1.8-1.10 with DR 5-101 & 5-103 to 5-105.
25. Compare Rule 1.12 with DR 9-102.
26. Compare Rule 1.1 with DR 6-101(A). This Rule attempts to define what is meant
by competence; the Code does not. The definition is problematic, however, in that It
encompasses matters pertaining to both innate legal skill and the degree of effort exer-
cised in a particular case. These effort factors overlap with other provisions of the
Model Rules. Cf. Rule 1.5 (diligence).
27. Compare Rule 1.16 with DR 2-110. The Rule retains the Code's distinction be-
tween permissive and mandatory withdrawal.
28. Rule 1.2.
29. Rule 1.4.
30. Rule 1.5.
31. Rule 1.6(b). Rule 1.6(a) also contains a duty to "adequately explain" the lawyer's
fee.
32. Rules 3.1-3.11.
33. Rule 3.12 (Advocate in Nonadjudicative Proceedings) (refers to a duty of fairness
[Vol. 12:948
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visor,M negotiator,35 intermediary, 36 and legal evaluator.3 7 Each is
subjected to individual analysis.
From what I can ascertain, this revised, role-oriented structure
achieves two principal objectives: First, it enables the Committee to
identify, analyze and ultimately sanction certain lawyering roles not
expressly recognized in the Code. Second, it clarifies the extent to
which certain ethical principles-applicable in the main-apply to par-
ticular lawyering tasks.
An illustration of the former type of provision is Proposed Rule
5.1. This Rule prescribes situations in which a lawyer may properly
serve as an intermediary between clients, a conflict of interest situa-
tion not specifically addressed by the Code. The rule would apply,
for example, to the attorney approached by two businessmen seeldng
legal advice on a prospective joint venture. Should an attorney at-
tempt to provide advice to both persons? When should the attorney
advise separate representation? Such situations as recognized by the
Model Rules are in some sense analogous to the role of "law.,yer for
the situation," an ethical and professional posture of some disre-
pute.3s The Code focuses almost exclusively on the role of the lawyer
as advocate and presumes a degree of loyalty on his part to the client
that is arguably inconsistent with his acting as "lawyer for the situa-
tion." As a result, the attorney who undertakes this role has historic-
ally entered into marginal ethical territory.
Responding to the Code's omission, the Rules recognize this dual
role, explore some of the difficult questions posed by the role and
provide a conditional justification for undertaking it. Does the
attorney-client privilege attach to communications among the lawyer
and clients if the relationship deteriorates and litigation ensues? In
most jurisdictions, no. What are the factors a law-yer should consider
in deciding whether to assume the intermediary's role? They include,
among others, the likelihood of prejudice if the relationship collapses,
and a duty to identify the client whom the attorney represents unless privileged; other
advocate duties are incorporated by reference).
34. Rules 2.1-2.5.
35. Rules 4.1-4.3.
36. Rules 5.1-5.2.
37. Rules 6.1-6.3.
38. The term "lawyer for the situation" was coined by Louis Brandeis. whose ethics
were questioned during Senate hearings to confirm his appointment to the Supreme
Court. For an account of the Brandeis case, see Frank, The Legal Ethics of Louis D.
Brandeis, 17 STAN. L. REv. 683 (1965).
1980]
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the bargaining styles and compatibility of the parties. May one party
to the transaction discharge the lawyer and, if so, may the lawyer
continue to represent the other party[ies]? Yes, to both questions,
the latter being subject to conflict of interest limitations. 39 And so on.
It becomes apparent when one examines this rule and others, es-
pecially the rules pertaining to the "legal evaluator," that the roles
being described are complex. They are also wholly outside the com-
pass of the Code. To the extent that these provisions identify and an-
alyze the ethical duties and conflicts which the roles entail, they
clearly perform a valuable function.
As an example of the second function of these new "role-
rules"--application of general ethical precepts to particular lawyering
situations--consider the problem of negotiation bartering. Employing
seemingly universal language, the Code prohibits positive fraud by an
attorney: "In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not know-
ingly make a false statement of law or fact." The context of the prohi-
bition, however, suggests that the rule is intended to govern attorneys'
communications to the court. A commonly raised question is whether
this rule can be understood to bar certain deceitful practices preva-
lent in negotiation. 40
Take for instance the false claim that "my client won't accept a
penny less than $10,000." Is this sort of bluff permissible, notwith-
standing the Code's apparent prohibition? Some would say yes,
relying on the doctrine of implied consent, the notion that in negotia-
tion certain types of false claims of fact are the convention, impliedly
agreed to in advance by the parties. 4 ' Others might well disagree,
citing the seemingly unequivocal language of the Code. What is the
lawyer to do when faced with this question in practice-when the
morality of the formal rules conflicts with the morality of the
marketplace?
The Code's failure to focus upon the process of negotiation per se
leaves the question unresolved. In contrast, the Model Rules address
this problem, and other similar "situational ethics" problems, square-
ly. The resolution of this particular issue is unequivocal. Rule 4.2
"Fairness to Other Participants" states:
39. See Rules 5.1-5.2 and accompanying comments. For an excellent discussion of
the problem, see HAZARD, supra note 9, at 58-68, 73-86.
40. For an excellent discussion of negotiation ethics problems, see Rubin, A Cau-
serie on Lawyers' Ethics in Negotiation, 35 LA. L. REv. 577 (1975). See also LIEBERMAN,
supra note 14, at 169-72.
41. See S. BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 109-10 (1979).
[Vol. 12:9418
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(a) In conducting negotiations a lawyer shall be fair dealing
with other participants.
(b) A lawyer shall not make a knowing misrepresentation of
fact or law .... 42
Thus the general rule, no false statements of fact, is expressly applica-
ble at the bargaining table.
In addition to addressing the Code's omissions, the Rules' draft-
ers have attempted to resolve the Code's ambiguities. With regard to
the most difficult professional responsibility questions-those having
to do with an attorney's conflicting obligations in an adversary sys-
tem, the Code has taken what might uncharitably be called a "smor-
gasbord" approach-providing a little something to satisfy lawyers of
all ethical persuasions. Take as a paradigm an ethics problem familiar
to all students of professional responsibility: the case of the criminal
defense lawyer whose client insists on committing perjury. The client
tells the lawyer that he wants to lie on the stand. The lawyer tells the
client that perjury is a crime and he will have no part of it. The client
insists on going forward. What is the lawyer to do?
Forced to choose between the loyalty to client which requires
keeping all client confidences secret and the duty of candor to a tri-
bunal, commentators have urged responses ranging from withdrawal
to ordinary zealous advocacy.43 The Code, however, takes an equivo-
42. See also Rule 3.2, reaching a similar conclusion.
43. In a well-known and controversial article, Monroe Freedman explores the princi-
pal options available: (1) withdrawal, without disclosure to the court of the client's in-
tended fraud; (2) withdrawal, with disclosure to the court if necessary (as is usually the
case) to accomplish withdrawal; (3) "mild advocacy" on behalf of te client, involving
continued representation but no active assistance in or use of the client's perjury, e.g.,
lawyer says "tell your story," but does not ask any directive questions during direct ex-
amination, and makes no reference to the false evidence during closing argument; and
(4) ordinarily zealous advocacy on the client's behalf. To the consternation of many.
Freedman adjudges the first option impractical, the second and third options undesira-
ble and opts for the fourth. Freedman believes that anything less than zealous advocacy
on behalf of the client penalizes and thus deters the client's candor with the lawyer,
and that without a completely open relationship, effective legal representation-in the
constitutional sense-is impossible. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Crim-
inal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L RE . 1469. 1470-78
(1966). The central ideas of this article are elaborated and slightly revised in M.
FREEDMAN, LAVYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975).
A spate of articles expressing many different views appeared immediately following
the publication of Freedman's piece. See, e.g., Bowman, Standards of Conduct for Pros-
ecution and Defense Personnel: An Attorney's Viewpoint, 5 A.M. Cmal. LQ. 28 (19866);
Bress, Professional Ethics in Criminal Trials: A View of Defense Counsel's Responsibil-
ity, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1493 (1966); Burger, Standards of Conduct for Prosecution and
1980]
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cal position on the issue.44 The attorney is told on the one hand that
he "shall not knowingly use perjured testimony," 45 and on the other
that he "may reveal the intention of his client to commit a crime."4
If a lawyer cannot avoid proffering the client's perjured testimony ex-
cept by revealing his client's intent to commit that crime to the
court, must he do so? Or may he? Not surprisingly, those who have
analyzed the Code's treatment of this question have expressed strong
views both ways. 47
The Rules resolve the lying client issue in an entirely novel way.
In a lengthy and careful discussion, the comments following Proposed
Rule 3.1 call for disclosure of perjury to the court, subject to legal
defenses regarding the scope and meaning of "due process" and the
"right to counsel."48 These defenses apparently may be developed on
a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis. In the absence of a caselaw trend
in this direction, it therefore can be expected that disciplinary
committees will choose to invoke a general duty of disclosure against
the defense bar.
B. Abandonment of the Distinction Between
"Rules" and "Aspirations"
The second principal structural change in the Rules is the aban-
donment of the Code's formal distinction between Ethical Considera-
tions and Disciplinary Rules. In their place, the drafters of the Rules
Defense Personnel: A Judge's Viewpoint, 5 AM. CRim. L.Q. 11 (1966); Friedman, Profes-
sional Responsibility in D.C.: A Survey, 1962 RES IPSA LOQUITUR 60 (1972); Gold, Split
Loyalty: An Ethical Problem for the Criminal Defense Lawyer, 14 CLEV.-MA. L. REv.
65 (1965); Noonan, The Purposes of Advocacy and the Limits of Confidentiality, 64
MICH. L. REV. 1485 (1966); Starrs, Professional Responsibility: Three Basic Proposi-
tions, 5 Am. CGIM. L.Q. 17 (1966). This is only a partial listing, containing principally
he earlier articles. For additional source materials, see the "references" section to Rule
3.2, at 70.
44. But see ABA Informal Opinion No. 1314 (1975) ("It is axiomatic that the right of
a client to effective counsel in any case . . . does not include the right to compel coun-
sel to knowingly assist or participate in the commission of perjury....
45. DR 7-102(A)(4).
46. DR 4-101(C)(3) (emphasis added). DR 7-102(A)(4) and DR 4-101(C)(3) directly
address the problems of the perjurious client. The confusion of these contradictory rules
is exacerbated if one takes into account the broad omnibus language of DR 1-102, espe-
cially DR 1-102(A)(5): "A lawyer shall not ... feingage in conduct that is prejudicial to
the administration of justice."
47. See note 43 supra.
48. See Rule 3.1 and accompanying comment. By adopting this rule the drafters re-
jected the "compromise" resolution of "mild- advocacy," now embodied in the ABA's
Standards Relating to the Defense Function, Rule 7.7 (1971).
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have substituted a more straightforward structure of "rules" and
"'comments." To be sure, the line between aspirational objectives and
mandatory rules has never been clear or precise. The Code, for ex-
ample, contains Ethical Considerations which, far from being merely
aspirational, explicate and clarify disciplinary rules and can thus be
ignored only at the attorney's peril. 49 The converse is true as well.
The Code sets forth certain Disciplinary Rules which, while phrased
in obligatory language, contain so many discretionary qualifiers as to
be virtually unenforceable. 50
Notwithstanding its blurred edges, the dichotomy has been ex-
tremely useful. Indeed, the legal philosopher Charles Frankel
thought it "in many contexts ... indispensable." 5' First, the distinc-
tion reminds us of the limited efficacy of rules in commanding high
moral behavior. Professional codes, like other bodies of law, cannot
49. Many examples could be used to illustrate this point. The Code's conflict of in-
terest provisions are instructive. The Code creates a sliding scale approach to conflict of
interest As a general rule, an attorney may not represent multiple parties with differing
interests. DR 5-105 (A & B). As an exception to the rule, an attorney may rejresent mul-
tiple parties with differing interests "if it is obvious that he can adequately represent
the interest of each and if each consents ... after full disclosure of the possible effect of
such representation .... DR 5-105(C). Nothing in the disciplinary rule itself helps re-
solve when dual representation can "adequately" be undertaken. For explication, the at-
torney must turn to the Ethical Considerations (e.g., EC 5-15: "A lawyer should never
represent in litigation multiple clients with differing interests .... ") Any attorney who
believes himself free to ignore such language because it is nominally an ethical consid-
eration is inviting professional difficulties.
50. One example I particularly like is DR 2-106 (Fees for Legal Services):
(A) A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal
or clearly excessive fee.
(B) A fee is clearly excessive when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordi-
nary prudence would be left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee
is in excess of a reasonable fee. Factors to be considered as guides in deter-
mining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly.
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the par-
ticular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(55) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
(6) The nature and length of the Orofessional relationship with the client.
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers per-
forming the services.
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
For a view that this "eight-factor formula produces a wide range of outcomes, particu-
larly [because] some of the factors are indeterminate," see HAZARD, supra note 9, at 97.
51. Frankel, Book Review (CODE OF PROFESSIoNAL RxsPoNsln=r), 43 U. Ctl. L.
REv. 874, 877 (1976).
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effectively compel standards of excellence, if those being regulated
are incapable of achieving that excellence. 52 Thus, despite the Rule's
good intentions, one may be skeptical of the feasibility of achieving
"competence" through the device of disciplinary command. Second,
the distinction is useful in emphasizing the limitations imposed by
language. As to certain realms of professional conduct, rules cannot
be codified in a fashion precise or comprehensive enough to account
for the complexities of human behavior. Excessive rule-making, ac-
cording to this view, creates a risk of insensitivity "to subtle differ-
ences between ethically problematic situations, to small variations in
relationships that call for quite different courses of action, and to the
fact that pretending to govern one's conduct solely by reference to
rules is either self-deceptive or a pretense." 53
The abandonment of Ethical Considerations contributes to the
draft's overall rule-consciousness and a certain inflexibility. There are
virtually no "should" provisions, comparable to the Code's Ethical
Considerations, anywhere in the draft. There are, to be sure, "may"
provisions, but they are far outnumbered by "shall" and "shall not"
provisions. 54 As in the Code, there is some inevitable language im-
precision in some of the Rules;55 but the meaning and purpose of
52. Id. at 877-80. By distinguishing between ethical considerations and disciplinary
rules, the Code's structure embraces Lon Fuller's distinction between the "morality of
duty" and the "morality of aspiration." The morality of aspiration is the morality of the
Good Life, of excellence, of the achievement of man's fullest capabilities. Such achieve-
ment is surely to be rewarded but is outside the scope of law. The morality of duty, on
the other hand, focuses on the basic rules without which an ordered society is impossi-
ble. Fuller himself recognizes that all moral arguments are about "where duty leaves off
and aspiration begins." L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 1-6, 10 (1964). For a cri-
tique of the notion that the morality of duty is "rationally discoverable and objective,"
see Hart, Book Review (THE MORALITY OF LAw), 78 HARv. L. REV. 1281 (1965).
53. HAZARD, supra note 9 at 4.
54. As compared to 103 provisions which direct that an attorney "shall" or "shall
not" do something, only 28 are phrased in permissive "may" language. It is interesting
to note that the sections dealing with advertising (Rule 9.2), solicitation (Rule 9.3(b))
and limited practice, (Rule 9.4) are phrased in predominantly permissive terms. These
sections may meet with substantial opposition from the organized bar, but unless the In-
dividual attorney chooses to advertise or solicit, the Rules impose no affirmative obliga-
tions upon him.
55. Many of the rules are phrased in language which requires the exercise of discre-
tion by the lawyer to determine if the situation confronting him requires a mandatory
response. A paradigm is the frequent use of the word "substantial" as a qualifier, as in
Rule 3.9(a): "A lawyer shall not act as an advocate .. .in litigation ... in which the law-
yer is likely to be a witness, unless: .. .(3) disqualification of the lawyer would work
substantial hardship to the client" (emphasis added). The word appears often through-
out the Rules. See, e.g., Rules 1.10(a)(1) (conflict of interest-"substantially related mat-
ter'); 3.1(c) (duty to report adverse legal authority-"substantial effect on the determina-
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particular sections is often made clear by the comments sections,
which follow the rules and, almost exclusively, endeavor to explicate
and justify them.56
I should make clear that the abandonment of Ethical Considera-
tions and the adoption of "role-rules" does not inevitably lead to in-
flexibility. The Rules' framers have been inconsistent in this regard.
They have drafted some nominally mandatory rules which, as a result
of fluid and multifaceted standards, seem deliberately to foster the
exercise of discretion. An example is the Model Rules' approach to
the ethical problems of corporate lawyers-the subject of a raging con-
troversy in recent years. 57 Questions such as to whom does the cor-
porate lawyer owe a fiduciary duty and in what circumstances must
corporate illegality be reported and to whom remain unresolved un-
der the "mandatory" directives of the Rules. Under Rule 1.13 the
lawyer, in taking "appropriate measures," must give "due considera-
tion" to such things as the seriousness of the offense, the lawyer's re-
sponsibility in the organization, the significance of hann to the organ-
ization which would result from disclosure or nondisclosure of agents'
wrongs and "company policy." If illegality persists despite the law-
yer's advice, he must disclose client confidences concerning the ille-
tion of a material issue"); 3.3(a) (duty to avoid procedures "having no substantial
purpose other than delay"); 3.4(b) (similar to 3.3(a)); 10.3 (duty of lawyers to report
"substantial" Rules violation by another lawyer).
Other indefinite words include "adequate" [Rules' 1.1 (adequate competence); 1.2 (ad-
equate attention); 1.5(b) (adequate disclosure of reasons not to pursue with diligence);
1.6 (fees-adequate explanation)] and "material" [Rules 1.10(a)(1) (conflict of interest
-no representation if interest adverse in material respect); 3.1(c) (duty to disclose legal
authority on material issue)]. In defense of such terms, it may be said that attempts at
more refined, precise language would have risked making the Rules either unduly rigid
or unwieldy.
56. For example, Rule 10.3, requires lawyers to report "substantial" Rules violations
by other lawyers. The accompanying comment adds a measure of clarity and substance
to the Rule by apprising lawyers that: "it is especially important to report a violation
where the victim is the offending lawyer's client and it is unlikely that the client will
discover the offense" and further, "when circumstances indicate the offense is serious,
or is indicative of persistent violations, there is a ... firm obligation to report .... Rule
10.3 (comment) at 132.
57. See, e.g., SEC v. National Student Marketing Ass'n, 360 F. Supp. 284 (D.D.C.
1973); LIEBERMAN, supra note 14, at 143-53; Sargent, The SEC and the Individual In-
vestor: Restoring His Confidence in the Market, 60 VA. L. REV. 553, 572 (1974);
Sommer, The Emerging Responsibilities of the Securities Lawyer, 1973-1974 FED. Sc.
L. REP. No. 79.631; Statement of Policy Adopted by American Bar Association Regard-
ing Responsibilities and Liabilities of Lawyers in Advising with Respect to Laws Ad-
ministered by the Securities and Exchange Commission, 31 Bus. LAw. 543 (1975); ABA
FoFitAL OPIMION No. 341 (1975).
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gality only if he believes it to be in the "best interest of the organiza-
tion." 58
The Rules thus sanction a kind of balancing process which ac-
cords the corporate attorney exceedingly broad discretion. This is not
an accident. The Rules' framers have made a conscious judgment that
in this realm of conduct, the limits of appropriate and inappropriate
behavior cannot effectively be captured by rules.59 Though denomi-
nated as such, this rule is hardly a "rule" at all.
If this were a typical provision in the Rules, one might want to
explore the desirability of its approach. What after all are the poten-
tial costs and benefits, to attorneys and clients, of phrasing discretion-
ary provisions in nominally mandatory terms? But it is not a typical
provision. The lying client and negotiation tactic provisions far better
represent the principal thrusts of the Rules-to take clear positions
on issues, to resolve uncertainty, and to increase uniformity and
predictability of results.
58. The full text of Rule 1.13(b & c) reads as follows:
(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee, or other
person associated with the organization is engaged in or intends action, or
a refusal to act, that is a violation of law and is likely to result in signifi-
cant harm to the organization, the lawyer shall use reasonable efforts to
prevent the harm. In determining the appropriate measures, the lawyer
shall give due consideration to the seriousness of the legal violation and its
consequences, the scope and nature of the lawyers' representation, the re-
sponsibility in the organization of the person involved, and the policies of
the organization concerning such matters. The measures taken shall be as-
signed to minimize disruption and the risk of disclosing confidences. Such
measures may include:
(1) Asking reconsideration of the matter;
(2) Seeking a separate legal opinion on the matter for presentation to ap-
propriate authority in the organization;
(3) Referring the matter to higher authority in the organization,
including, if necessary, referral to the highest authority that can act in be-
half of the organization as determined by applicable law.
(c) If, despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b), the
highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon ac-
tion, or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law and is likely to re-
sult in substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer may take further
remedial action, including disclosure of client confidences to the extent
necessary, if the lawyer reasonably believes such action to be in the best
interest of the organization.
59. HAZARD, supra note 9, at 43-57 passim.
It is difficult to imagine a set of prescriptions that could definitively offer ...
guidance [in this area], any more than definitive prescriptions can be supplied
for resolving the moral dilemmas of everyday life. If that is so, the lawyer has
to let his judgment, perhaps one might say his conscience, be his guide.
Id. at 57.
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The Model Rules and the Code, from a purely mechanical point
of view, are thus polar opposites. The Code often merely identifies
ethical dilemmas; the Model Rules provide a rule oriented structure
replete with numerous and specific role illustrations and explanatory
comments which take lawyers firmly by the hand and lead them
through the ethically "proper" course of action.
While the Model Rules' endeavor to replace the Code's ambigu-
ity with clarity and inconsistency of enforcement with predictability is
laudable, it is nonetheless achieved with certain costs. One cost is the
prospect of substantial dissension within the profession regarding the
Rules' resolution of certain difficult ethical issues. The language and
structure of the Code have permitted the profession to avoid the un-
pleasant task of achieving a broad consensus on such problems. The
problem of the lying client serves as an illustration of this point. It is
probably safe to assume that the ambiguity in the Code and wide-
ranging debate in literature have emboldened the criminal defense
lawyer with the perjurious client to reach a personal moral choice,
confident at least that whatever choice is exercised will find a modi-
cum of support. Personal choice in this realm may or may not be a
desired result. Considering the ambivalence of the profession about
this particular question,"0 however, it has certainly been a convenient
one.
A second potential cost of the Rules' structure involves the possi-
bility that it will unnecessarily limit the exercise of individual discre-
tion. Lawyers, of course, have no claim to absolute discretion in the
field of legal ethics. To paraphrase Holmes, most laws forbid men
from doing some things they want to do and ethics is no more ex-
empt from law than other areas. 6' Nevertheless, even in situations
where the essential determinants may vary dramatically from one fact
pattern to another despite ostensible similarities, in other words,
where the exercise of individual discretion is most desirable, the
drafters of the Rules sometimes insist upon an intractable standard of
ethical behavior.
In any event, the preface of the Model Rules seems ironic when
it states as one of its underlying assumptions: "there are limits as to
what a legislative statement can effectively address. [N]o worthwhile
60. See note 86 infra and accompanying text.
61. See Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 568 (1923) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting).
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human activity can be completely defined by legal rules."6 2 If one is
looking for deregulation of the profession as a guiding principle of
these rules-for fewer rules, 63 fewer "shalls," more "mays"64 and
wider latitude of autonomy and freedom of choice-one will surely be
disappointed.
II. THE ADVERSARIAL FUNCTION
In the process of clarification and rulemaking, the Model Rules
express a powerful substantive direction toward modification of the
adversary function. While the Code's central fiduciary obligation is
"zealous advocacy within the bounds of the law," 65 the concept of
"zealous advocacy" is not a part of the Rules.66 This, I believe, was
not an oversight. The Rules take as their premise that it is desirable
to restrain zealous representation by lawyers and to increase the obli-
gations of candor and fairness owed by lawyers to tribunals and to
opposing parties.
Strong hints about the framers' governing attitudes towards the
adversary system are scattered in interstitial remarks throughout the
document, viz.:
A lawyer should not merely avoid harassing litigation, but
should engage in litigation only when a negotiated settle-
ment cannot be obtained on satisfactory terms.6 7
A trial should be conducted with a sense of propriety and
respect for its purpose of arriving at a just and fair result.
While a trial in its nature is a contentious proceeding, the
62. Preface to MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT at ii (Discussion Draft
1980).
63. Whereas the Code contained 41 basic rules, the Rules list 57. This may be mis-
leading, however. If one takes into account the various subprovisions, qualifications, ex-
clusions and the like which both documents contain, they are roughly comparable in
their regulatory scope.
64. See notes 23-63 supra and accompanying text.
65. Canon 7 of the Code states: "A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously
Within the Bounds of Law."
66. The closest analog in the Rules is Rule 1.5, entitled "Diligence." Both this rule
and the accompanying comment emphasize that a lawyer is "not bound to press for ev-
ery advantage that might be realized for a client." Rules § 1.5 (Comment) at 16. Most of
the provisions of the rule state exceptions to the basic requirement that a lawyer vindi-
cate his client's cause by all lawful means, allowing, for example, a lawyer to "limit the
nature and purposes of his representation" if this can be done without prejudicing the
client's interest. Id. 1.5(c).
67. Rule 3.2 (Comment) at 69-70.
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law's procedure aims to determine a controversy nonvio-
lently and, if possible, in an atmosphere of tranquility.68
There is controversy whether disclosure is required of a fact
that would substantially affect the determination of a mate-
rial issue but which has not been preserved by opposing
counsel .... When an adversary has failed to present ... a
[probably decisive] fact, the system manifestly has suffered
breakdown . . . . (The Commission considered, but did not
adopt a provision requiring the disclosure of facts known to
a lawyer which "would probably have a substantial effect on
the determination of a material issue.") 9
These statements are not rules, but they express the drafters' deep
concern, their overriding skepticism about the adversary system-
about the capacity of courts, as presently structured, to achieve sub-
stantial justice, about the social costs of litigation, and above all about
the image of trial lawyers as "streetfighters," 70 owing only limited ob-
ligations to those not their clients.
This outlook is reflected in numerous rule revisions. Some of the
more important are:
(1) The Rules propose new restraints and new obligations on at-
torneys involved in ex parte proceedings and proceedings against
unrepresented parties. Seeking to rectify the imbalance that such
proceedings present, attorneys in ex parte proceedings are required
to "disclose all relevant facts" even if adverse and "seek no greater
relief than is legally justified." 7' Attorneys appearing against unrep-
resented parties are advised to "refrain from exploiting that party's ig-
norance of the law .... 72
(2) The Rules propose a new obligation on attorneys to keep liti-
gation moving forward. Whereas under the Code a lawyer had a
duty, phrased in negative terms, to avoid frivolous or dilatory pro-
ceedings, 73 the Rules would impose a positive duty to "make every
effort consistent with the legitimate interests of the client to expedite
litigation."74
68. Id. at 69.
69. Rule 3.1 (Comment) at 62-63.
70. HAZARD, supra note 9, at 134.
71. Rule 3.5.
72. Rule 3.6.
73. DR 7-102(B).
74. Rule 3.3(a).
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(3) The Rules establish new obligations of fairness to opposing
lawyers and parties in negotiation and other litigation processes. I
have already spoken of the obligation to avoid misleading statements
of fact and law in negotiation. Another duty would require the attor-
ney to audit the results of a negotiated settlement, viz.: "A lawyer
shall not conclude an agreement that the lawyer knows or reasonably
should know ... would be held unconscionable as a matter of law." 75
(4) The Rules expand the attorney's obligation to deal candidly
with courts and tribunals about legal authority. Whereas under the
Code an attorney has a duty to disclose legal authority in the con-
trolling jurisdiction directly adverse to his client's position, 76 that ob-
ligation would be broadened to require disclosure of any "legal au-
thority known to the lawyer that would probably have a substantial
effect on the determination of a material issue." 77
(5) The Rules expand the attorney's obligation of candor with re-
spect to facts. As alluded to earlier, the Code's prohibitions have
traditionally been limited to positive fraud, for example, a lawyer may
not "knowingly make a false statement of fact or law." 78 In addition to
prohibiting positive frauds, the Rules prohibit half-truths, statements
which although true by themselves, "without suitable explanation"
are "substantially misleading." 79 The Rules also penalize attorneys
who fail to correct representations which, although true when made,
are later discovered to be untrue or misleading.80
(6) Finally, and most dramatically, the Rules impose on the attor-
ney greatly expanded obligations to prevent or rectify the conse-
quences of a client's misconduct, even if this requires disclosure of
client confidences to a court or a third person. For example, in civil
representation if a lawyer discovers, even after the fact, that a client
has committed perjury, the lawyer would be required under the
Rules to disclose the client's perjury to the court."' This rule simply
reverses a parallel section in the Code.8 2 With regard to completed
client misconduct other than fraud, the Rules would for the first time
permit disclosure of that misconduct in order to "rectify the conse-
75. Rule 4.8.
76. DR 7-106(B)(1).
77. Rule 3.1(c).
78. DR 7-102(A)(5), discussed notes 40-41 supra and accompanying text.
79. Rule 3.1(a)(3).
80. Rule 3.1(d)(2).
81. Rule 3.1(b).
82. DR 7-102(B)(1).
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quences of a deliberately wrongful act." 83 And, in addition to the ab-
solute prohibition against lawyers offering testimony known to be
false,84 attorneys are given explicit authority to refuse to offer "un-
trustworthy testimony," as part of a new and more general right to
decline to assist a client in an "unjust course of conduct."Is
It is no exaggeration to say that these changes, taken together,
constitute a radical modification of the lawyer's traditional adversarial
posture. Many, it is already clear, will not be received with open arms
by the organized bar.
Take, for example, the problem of the lying client. As a result of
a 1972 survey, we know that the Rules' proposed resolution of this
problem-requiring as a general rule that the defense lawyer reveal
his client's perjury to the court if necessary to avoid presenting it-
flies in the face of the practices and the apparent beliefs of the over-
whelming majority of the criminal defense bar.86 Likewise, the obli-
gation to apprise the court of adverse legal authority is out of step
with the perceptions of practicing attorneys. The same survey posed
the following hypothetical:
Opposing counsel has not raised cases you know to be con-
trary to the proposition you have set forth. You have a list of
these cases. It is obvious that opposing counsel has done a
poor research job, because these cases are squarely against
your position. Do you have an obligation to make the Court
or opposing counsel aware of these contrary authorities?
Would you?
In response to this question, roughly one-half of the trial lawyers sur-
veyed believed that the Code obligated them to inform the court
83. Rule 1.7(c) provides:
A lawyer may disclose information about a client only . (2) to the extent it
appears necessary to prevent or rectify the consequences of a deliberately
wrongful act by the client, except when the lawyer has been employed after the
commission of such an act to represent the client concerning the act or its con-
sequences.
84. Rule 3.1(a)(3).
85. Rule 3.1(e) states: "Except as provided in paragraph (f) (criminal defense cases)
a lawyer may ... refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer believes with substantial rea-
son to be false." See also Rules 3.1(e) (Comment) at 67.
86. Friedman, Professional Responsibility in D.C., 1972 RES IPSA LOQUITUR 60. Of
135 defense attorneys polled in this survey, 128 (95%) answered that they would put a
perjurious client on the stand rather than seek withdrawal, and if necessary, expose the
client's perjury to the court. 115 attorneys (87%) said that they would question the
witness just as they would any other. Id. at 81.
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about the adverse cases. But 93% indicated that they would never-
theless not do So.87
Of course, discussion of the prognosis for successful passage of
the Rules, or the extent to which they reflect what lawyers do in
practice, misses the point. Clearly the Rules' drafters knew that the
task they were undertaking was not merely a descriptive one-to
identify and perpetuate customary morality. The drafting committee
is to be commended for its willingness to assume a normative ethical
function, even at the risk of taking controversial positions. Those who
would prescribe normative ethical rules, however, take on the burden
of providing objective, principled justifications for them. The liberal-
ized provisions in the Rules regulating advertising and solicitation find
clear support in the pages of United States Reports.88 The proposed
new sections creating duties of diligence, adequate communication
and prompt attention have an empirical basis in the client complaint
records of state grievance panels.8 9 The justifications for modifying
the adversary system and the advocate's role are not so clear.
For purposes of analysis, the rules concerning the adversarial
function can be divided into two principal, related categories. The
first category of rules has as its primary objective increasing the advo-
cate's responsibility, personally and directly, to assist the functioning
of the adversary system. Falling into the first category of rules are the
provisions pertaining to ex parte proceedings and proceedings against
unrepresented parties, the expanded obligation imposed on attorneys
to expedite litigation, and the rule prohibiting the proffer "without
suitable explanation [of] evidence that the lawyer knows is substan-
tially misleading," among others. The second category of rules ex-
pands the role of the lawyer to audit and monitor the client's
conduct by increasing the attorney's obligation to prevent the client
from abusing the adversary process, prevent the client from
committing harmful acts towards third persons and rectify the client's
wrongful conduct once it has been completed. Both categories of
rules have as their main objective preventing breakdowns in the ad-
versary process. Both categories of rules have as a potential by-prod-
uct a substantial reduction in the protections of secrecy and
confidentiality which have historically been accorded to the lawyer-
87. Id. at 83.
88. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); In re Primus, 436 U.S.
412 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
89. See Steele & Nimmer, supra note 6, at 946-63.
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client relationship. But this latter result is more pronounced as to the
second category of rules.
On the face of it, the first category of rules is unremarkable.
Like the capitalistic system of economic organization, the Anglo-
American adversary system has at its root the ideal of individual com-
petition.90 Ordinarily an advocate has a limited responsibility to pre-
sent one side of a contested matter; the conflicting position is ex-
pected to be presented fully and forcefully by opposing counsel. 9 '
Rules constraining the advocate when an opposing party is either ab-
sent entirely from the courtroom or unrepresented by counsel seem
in this context eminently sensible. They are designed to remedy the
more extreme disparities of knowledge and power which can occur
when one side is unrepresented during adversary proceedings.
The rule creating expanded obligations on lawyers to take all
steps consistent with "legitimate"9 2 client interests to expedite litiga-
tion is similar in purpose. In drafting this rule, the Commission has
90. S. THURuAN, E. PHILLIPS & E. CHEATHA.M, CASES ON THE LEGAL PROFESSIO N
287-88 (1970); Friedman, Professional Responsibility in D.C., 1972 RES IPSA LOQUITUR
60, 61.
91. Rule 3.5 (Comment) at 74.
92. Rule 3.3 states that a
lawyer shall make every effort consistent with the legitimate interests of the cli-
ent to expedite litigation. Realizing financial or other benefit from otherwise
improper delay... is not a legitimate interest. ... A lawyer shall not engage in
any procedure or tactic having no substantial purpose other than delay or
increasing the cost of litigation to another party.
The comment to the rule notes the difficulty of defining precise standards because of
the danger on the one hand that "[a] claim or defense having little or no authority in ex-
isting precedent may have great potential for inviting a change in the law" and on the
other hand that lax standards would make commonplace "all but the most flagrant
abuses of procedure." The Comment supplies the following test: "[tihe essential ques-
tion is whether reasonably competent counsel could conclude in good faith that the
claim or defense in question has substantial basis." Rule 3.3 (Comment) at 72.
For a proposal similar to the one adopted in the Rules, see Edelstein, Tile Ethics of
Dilatory Motion Practice: Time for Change, 44 FORDHAM L. REv. 1069 (1976). The au-
thor, a senior federal judge, notes that other remedies (taxation of costs, striking of
pleadings) are theoretically available against dilatory counsel but are ini fact utilized in
only the most extreme cases. Id. at 1069-72. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1927; FED. R. Ctv. P.
7(b)(2), 11. Despite recent concerns about increased delays in the administration of just-
ice, this ought not to be surprising. Judges are rightly sensitive to the dangers of undue
interference with the conduct and methods of trial lawyers. See Morgan, The Evolving
Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REv. 702, 735-37 (1977). Just as the
court rules have not been vigorously enforced, one may have doubts whether the pro-
posed standards in the Rules can or will be utilized by local grievance committees.
There is also the question of whether the standard is precise enough to avoid chal-
lenges on the ground of vagueness.
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attempted to address the significant problem of under-representation.
Lawyers well know that inequality of resources among parties and law
firms leads to daily abuse in the conduct of pretrial litigation. 93 Just
as the laissez-faire theory of capitalism has been modified to account
for monopolistic and anti-competitive practices, this rule proposes to
modify the adversary ideal of zealous advocacy to achieve cheaper,
more expeditious resolution of disputes. The costs of unduly pro-
tracted litigation are borne not only by the parties but also by society
as a whole. Thus, if this rule achieves its purposes, it will surely be
justified in utilitarian terms. 94
Where both parties to a litigation are fully and adequately repre-
sented, however, rules limiting the adversary function are more open
to question. The rule prohibiting advocates from offering "substan-
tially misleading evidence" without "suitable explanation" is a case in
point. To illustrate the workings of this rule, consider the case of
Sacco and Vanzetti.
Sacco and Vanzetti were charged with the murder of one Berar-
delli. In order to identify them as the murderers, it was vital to identify
one of the fatal bullets as a bullet coming from Sacco's pistol. At the
trial a ballistics expert testified on direct examination as follows:
Q. Have you an opinion as to whether bullet No. 3 [Ex-
hibit 18] was fired from the Colt automatic which is in evi-
dence [Sacco's pistol]? A. I have.
Q. And what is your opinion? A. My opinion is that it is
consistent with being fired from that pistol [emphasis
added]. 95
After the defendants' conviction, the expert swore by affidavit that he
was unable through tests to link the bullet to Sacco's particular pistol;
that all he could say definitively was that the bullet came from a Colt
automatic like that owned by Sacco; that the prosecutor knew these
facts and that he consciously framed his examination questions as he
did so as to withhold this crucial evidence. No questions about this
93. The most forthright of lawyers occasionally own up to the practice themselves,
gloating about their own versions ofJarndyce v. Jarndyce-the antitrust case kept in dis-
covery for 10 years, the poor widow papered to the point of voluntary dismissal, and so
forth. See, e.g., LIEBERMAN, supra note 14, at 163-66. Cf. C. DICKENS, BLEAK HoUsE
(1853).
94. See Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARv. L.
REV. 702, 706 (1977) (arguing a utilitarian thesis that expeditious dispute resolution Is a
higher value than achieving or satisfying the interests of clients).
95. F. FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETTI 76 (1927).
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line of testimony were asked by defense counsel on cross-exam-
ination.
A perversion of justice? Perhaps. Two men went to their deaths
on the basis of incomplete, potentially misleading, and crucial expert
evidence. Yet putting aside special prosecutorial obligations contained
in the Code, 95 this sort of questioning has always been presumed to
be well within the realm of permissible trial tractics. The rationale, of
course, is that defense counsel, attentive to the weaknesses in the
prosecution's case, can and will expose them on cross-examination. It
seems clear that the proposed rule, prohibiting substantially mislead-
ing questions, would relieve defense counsel of this obligation and
place the responsibility for presenting a more complete account on
the shoulders of the prosecutor.
In examining the justifications for limiting the adversary role
when both parties have full and adequate representation it is well to
consider the several competing views of the adversary system. The
traditional justification of the adversary system is that it is the best
available mechanism for achieving impartial justice. According to this
view, the presentation of evidence through zealous opposing counsel
to a passive adjudicator forestalls the natural human tendency to
reach premature conclusions and lends itself best to a full and com-
plete exploration of facts. 97
According to a second view, the Legal Realist school, the idea
that the adversary system has as its primary goal the ascertainment of
"truth" is mere myth. Whatever the theoretical justifications of the
adversary system, some eminent scholars believe that trials are a rit-
ual, a civilized substitute for a fight or brawl, in which the only value
truly served is the satisfaction of the parties. 98 It is, of course, diffi-
cult to define normative limits on the advocate's role if one subscribes
96. DR 7-103(B), incorporating the constitutional rule of Brady v. Md., 373 U.S. 83
(1963), requires a prosecutor to disclose to defense counsel evidence that, inter alia,
"tends to negate the guilt of the accused." This provision is carried forward in some-
what broadened form in Rule 3.10(d), requiring the prosecutor to "seek all evidence,
whether or not favorable to the accused, and make timely disclosure to the defense of
all evidence supporting innocence or mitigating the defense." Whether either of these
provisions would have obligated the prosecutor in Sacco and Vanzetti to disclose his
expert's inability to trace the fatal bullet to Sacco's gun is questionable. As the Com-
ment to the Rule states, "[p]recisely how far the prosecutor is required to go in this di-
rection is a matter of debate." Comment to Rule 3.10, at 83.
97. Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159,
1160 (1958).
98. C. Cu-Tis, IT'S YouR LAW (1954); J. FRANK, CounTs ON TniAL (1949); Curtis,
The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REv. 3 (1951).
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to a "fight" theory of the adversary system. So it is not surprising that
the Rules' framers have rejected this theory.
A third view of the adversary system-a variant of the first and
second-is that the system serves two objectives: the ascertainment
of truth and the ideal of party participation. According to this view,
the presentation of evidence through competing counsel lends itself
reasonably well to achieving fair results. At the same time, the repre-
sentation of parties by committed and zealous advocates gives the liti-
gant a sense of involvement in and control of the trial process,
underscoring our nation's philosophical and constitutional commit-
ment to individual autonomy and political freedom. 99
A fourth view of the adversary system regards it as exaggerated
and extreme, involving systematic distortion of the truth and per-
ceived by the public with "cynical abhorrence.' 10 0 This school of
thought is hardly new. Dean Roscoe Pound, writing in 1906, argued
that the "sporting theory of justice" was a principal cause of public
dissatisfaction with the legal profession. 1 1 Proponents of this school
seek to limit or substantially modify the adversary function and occa-
sionally argue for adoption of some form of civil law or interrogative
system, whereby the adjudicator participates more actively in the in-
vestigation and determination of facts.
The Model Rules' reformulation of the adversary's role reflects a
fairly recent resurgence of interest in restraining the adversary func-
tion. Those who are familiar, for example, with the articles of Marvin
Frankel and Alvin Rubin will recognize the deep imprint of their
ideas on the proposed Rules. 10 2 "Modify the adversary ideal; make
truth a paramount objective; impose a duty upon litigants to pursue
99. Jerome Frank has stated the proposition as follows:
Many lawyers maintain that the "fight" theory and the "truth" theory coincide.
They think that the best way for a court to discover the facts in a suit is to have
each side strive as hard as it can, in a keenly partisan spirit, to bring to the
court's attention the evidence favorable to that side. Macaulay said that we ob-
tain the fairest decision "when two men argue, as unfairly as possible, on oppo-
site sides ......
J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 80-81 (1949).
For a discussion of the political and philosophical roots of the American adversary
system, see HAZARD, supra note 9, at 120-22, 134-35.
100. The phrase, again, is Professor Hazard's. See HAZARD supra note 9, at 124.
101. Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Jus-
tice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395, 404 (1906).
102. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1031
(1975); Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyers' Ethics in Negotiation, 35 LA. L. REv. 577 (1975).
Mr. Frankel, it bears emphasizing, was a member of the Rules drafting commission.
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that objective"' 0 -these are themes common to both articles. They
are interesting and provocative articles. I require my students to read
them. But, by themselves, and considering the competing views of
the principal objectives of the adversary system, it is questionable
whether they establish a case for its fundamental revamping.
Discussion of the second category of rules-requiring the advo-
cate to prevent and rectify client wrongs even if this requires disclo-
sure of client confidences-illustrates the extent to which the Rules
propose fundamental changes in the adversary function.1 04 I shall not
discuss each of the particular rule revisions; one example must bear
the entire burden. I shall speak of the lawyer's duty to inform the
court of his client's completed fraud.
In order to flesh out this problem, I offer the following hypothet-
ical. A lawyer represents a minority plaintiff in an employment dis-
crimination case. Strong prima facie evidence exists to support the
claim. Throughout the proceedings the presiding judge has been hos-
tile to the plaintiff, the lawyer, and the claim. At an early stage, he
granted a motion by defendant for summary judgment, a ruling which
was peremptorily reversed by the court of appeals. On remand, the
judge is now unreasonably pressing the parties toward a trial date,
thereby restricting the plaintiff's ability to pursue discovery. He sets
a trial date for the day after Christmas. The day is inconvenient for
both attorney and client, the client having planned to be wvith his
family in another state. Five days before the trial date, the client
telephones the lawyer from the other state and tells him that he has
suffered serious internal injuries in a car accident. The lawyer informs
the judge, who demands a notarized letter from the client. The client
supplies one; the judge reluctantly grants a three-month continuance.
One month later, the lawyer meets again with his client. The client
admits to the lawyer that while he did have an accident and was
103. See Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Urnpireal View, 123 U. PA. L REV.
1031, 1052 (1975). "Our relatively low regard for truth seeking," says Frankel, "is per-
haps the chief reason for the dubious esteem in which the legal profession is held." Id.
at 1040. Rule 3.1(a)(3) prohibiting lawyers from offering "without suitable explanation
evidence that the lawyer knows is substantially misleading," is virtually identical to the
central proposal of Frankel's article. Id. at 1057-58. The impact of Judge Rubin's
ideas on the negotiation provisions of the Rules is equally clear.
For some critical responses to Frankel's proposals, see Nessen, Rethinking the Law-
yer's Duties to Disclose Information: A Critique of Judge Frankel's Proposals, 24
N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 677 (1979); Uviller, The Advocate, the Truth and judicial Hackles:
A Reaction to Judge Frankel's Idea, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1067 (1965).
104. See notes 89-90 supra and accompanying text.
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shaken up he did not suffer serious injury as stated in his letter. The
client says to the lawyer, "Now we've got time to pin down a few
more key facts, don't we?"
Must the lawyer disclose the client's fraud to the judge? Under
the Canons of Ethics from 1953 to 1969, no. Under the Code from
1970 to 1974, maybe. Under the Code subsequent to 1974, clearly
not. Under the Rules, a resounding "yes." Recall that the Rules'
drafters have claimed that their revisions reflect a "continuing evolu-
tion in ethical thought." Let us review the "evolution" with respect
to this problem.
From 1953 to 1969, the prevailing rule was stated in ABA
Formal Opinion 287. In that opinion, the ABA considered the prob-
lem of whether a lawyer, learning from a former client that he had
given materially false testimony during a deposition in a divorce case,
must disclose the perjury to the court. The Committee held no, rea-
soning that the duty of the lawyer to preserve a client's confidences
prevails over the duty to reveal a client's fraud.
When the Code was originally adopted in 1969, it contained two
provisions relevant to this issue. DR 7-102(b), the fraud section, read:
"A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that (1) his
client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud
upon a person or tribunal shall [if the client fails to rectify it] reveal
the fraud to the affected person or tribunal." DR 4-101(C)(2), an ex-
ception to the confidentiality rules, allowed a lawyer to reveal client
confidences where "permitted" under the disciplinary rules. It was
certainly possible to construe these rules together as an attempt to al-
ter the result in Opinion 287. DR 7-102(B), however, contained the
ambiguous footnote, "But see ABA Opinion 287." The effect of this
footnote was to perpetuate, indeed to exacerbate, the conflict be-
tween the confidentiality and fraud provisions, leaving courts, lawyers
and disciplinary panels to resolve the conflict on a case-by-case ba-
sis. 1 o5
In February 1974, DR 7-102(B) was amended to add the quali-
fying language "except when the information is protected as a privi-
leged communication." The purpose of this amendment was "to re-
lieve lawyers of exposure to .. . diametrically opposed professional
duties" and to "reinstate the essence of Opinion 287," holding that
the duty to preserve a client's confidences prevails over the duty to
expose a client's frauds.' 0 6
105. A. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 147 (1975).
106. ABA FORMAL OPINION No. 341 (1975).
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The Rules' drafters have resolved to overturn the status quo.
Their proposed rule is firm and unambiguous:
Except in [criminal defense cases], if a lawyer discovers
that evidence or testimony presented by the lawyer is false,
the lawyer shall disclose that fact and take suitable measures
to rectify the consequences, even if doing so requires disclo-
sure of a confidence of the client or disclosure that the client
is implicated in the falsification. 10 7
What is the rationale for this revision? Surely no "evolution of
ethical thought." The bar's inconsistent treatment of this particular
problem over the last quarter century is symptomatic of its deep am-
bivalence about the conflicting responsibilities of the attorney in an
adversary system. The problem of the lying client, and others like
it, raise the most difficult questions in professional responsibility. In-
deed, they are intractable, because they pit against each other values
as fundamental as they are irreconcilable: 08 the fiduciary's obligations
of loyalty and secrecy vs. the duties of honesty and of avoiding harm
to others.10 9
Can this new rule, and others like it, be justified in utilitarian
terms? Probably not. The Rules' framers assume that provisions that
require lawyers to reveal their clients' frauds and create other excep-
tions to established principles of confidentiality will engender,
systemically, more "truth." But it is also clear that these rules will ex-
act a price on the free flow of information between individual lawyers
107. Rule 3.1(b).
108. If one examines, for example, the literature on Monroe Freedman's lying client
problem, one discovers that it is extensive, sometimes self-righteous, occasionally vitri-
olic and on the whole inconclusive. See, e.g., Friedman, Professional Responsibility in
D.C.: A Survey, 1972 RES IPSA LoQurruR 60, 61 n.7 (1972) (supporting Freedman's res-
olution of the problem and suggesting that many distinguished attorneys including
Anthony Amsterdam and Thurman Arnold do as well); see also Berger, Standards of
Conduct for Prosecution and Defense Personnel, 5 AM. CiuaL. L.Q. 11, 12 (19866) ("The
proposition that pexjury may ever be knowingly used is ... pernicious .... [It] is so ut-
terly absurd that one wonders why the subject need even be discussed among persons
trained in the law."); Noonan, The Purposes of Advocacy and the Limits of Con-
fidentiality, 64 MIcu. L. REv. 1485 (1966); Note, The Perjury Dilemma in an Adversary
System, 82 DIcK. L. REv. 545, 571 (1978).
109. Jethro Lieberman considers many of these problems under the rubric the "eth-
ics of doing harm." Although he concedes its historical importance, he is critical of the
"basic tenet of the lawyer's creed that it is ethical to aid those bent on acting
unethically." LIEBEBMAN, supra note 14, at 136-75. For a philosophical treatment of this
problem, see Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-
Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976).
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and clients. To some degree then, rules limiting lawyer-client
confidentiality will inhibit client candor, resulting in less effective
representation by lawyers and in lawyers having fewer "truths" about
their clients to disclose. "Truth," said Knight-Bruce, C.J., "like all
other good things, may be loved unwisely, may be pursued too
keenly-may cost too much." 110 Without access to lawyers' offices
where consultations occur, we as a society will have no means of
measuring what the cost of these proposals are and whether the ben-
efit was worth it.
III. CONCLUSION
The rule-oriented, task-specific format of the Rules gives clear
guidance to attorneys facing ethical problems in a way the Code most
emphatically did not. Nevertheless, the application of this format to
the most difficult litigation ethics issues raises the spectre of a divi-
sive struggle over the Rules as a whole. If one examines the most
radical changes in the Rules, they mostly pertain to trial advocacy
and to negotiation-the principal litigation functions."' One problem
remains to be considered: why did not the Rules' drafters adopt more
flexible standards in these areas, similar to the rule proposed for
"organizational lawyers?"" 2
One answer, though not a very charitable one, is that the Rules'
drafters are as deeply disdainful of trial lawyers as they are of the ad-
versary process itself. This attitude pervades Geoffrey Hazard's Ethics
in the Practice of Law, a direct lineal ancestor of the Rules and oth-
erwise a very balanced work. It is found in comments like: "It would
110. Pearse v. Pearse, I DeGex and Sm. 28, 29 (1846), quoted in D. EMMET, RULES,
ROLES AND RELATIONS 161 (1966).
111. See notes 57-59 supra and accompanying text.
112. See notes 71-85 supra and accompanying text.
Take my employment hypothetical, a loaded one to be sure. Instead of a rigid rule
requiring the advocate in all cases to "blow the whistle" on his client, one can imagine
a substitute rule such as the one which follows:
Rule 3.1(b) If a lawyer discovers from his client that evidence or testimony
presented by his client is false, the lawyer shall call on the client to rectify the
situation. If the client refuses to do so, the lawyer has two options-to disclose
the client's fraud or to protect the client's confidence. In considering which
duty is paramount, the lawyer shall consider the strength of the evidence, un-
der relevant law, that a penal violation has occurred, the seriousness of that pe-
nal violation, the materiality of the false evidence to the merits of the case and
the extent to which presentation of the false evidence has harmed third parties,
This rule was not difficult to draft. It takes account of several factors that might affect
how an attorney would execute discretion in a particular case. Why did the Commission
eschew such an approach?
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be better if there were a larger constituency that understood, with
Judge Learned Hand, that being in litigation, whatever its outcome,
can justly be compared with sickness and death"113 and in the ex-
tended discussion at the close of the book as to why "good lawyers
represent big corporations" and why the securities, antitrust and tax
bars are "competent" and "highly esteemed."' 14
A second answer is that the Commission well knew that they
were drafting a public document and that the nature of certain issues
would not lend themselves well to explicit grants of discretion. This
was a decade, after all, in which the public witnessed prominent law-
yers stand by while their clients shredded documents and lied to leg-
islative committees. It would not have done, I suppose, to grant law-
yers freedom of choice to permit their clients to commit frauds, even
"insubstantial" or "harmless" ones.
To the extent that this latter view is a correct one, the Rules can
be seen as an attempt to address the post-Watergate surge of public
antipathy toward the legal profession. It is not an irresponsible effort.
Perhaps the drafters are correct that over-zealousness by trial lawyers
is a principal reason for this antipathy. On the other hand, one sus-
pects that the public is more deeply ambivalent about the adversary
function than the Rules' drafters might care to admit. Lawyer as
"mouthpiece," lawyer as champion-these are but two sides of the
same coin. The warrior lawyer, advocating his client's case against all
odds, knowing no cause but his client's"-5-this lawyer remains a
powerful, evocative figure in Anglo-American law and politics, a fig-
ure to whom many citizens and lawyers can be expected to be
deeply, even angrily committed." 16
113. HAZARD, supra note 9, at 135.
114. Id. at 150-53.
115. Cf. Lord Brougham's classic oral argument in defense of Queen Caroline:
An advocate, by the sacred duty which he owes his client, knows, in the dis-
charge of that office, but one person in the world, THAT CLIENT AND NONE
OTHER. To save the client by all expedient means-to protect that client at all
hazards and costs to all others, and amongst others to himself-is the highest
and the most unquestioned of his duties; and he must not regard the alarm, the
suffering, the torment, the destruction, which he may bring upon any other.
Nay, separating even the duties of a patriot from those of an advocate, and cast-
ing them, if need be, to the wind, he must go on reckless of the consequences,
if his fate should unhappily be, to involve his country in confusion for his cli-
ent's protection.
BROUGHAM'S SPEECHES, i. 103-5 reprinted in Rogers, The Ethics of Advocacy, 15 L.Q.
REv. 259, 269 (1899).
116. Trial lawyers tend, for their part, to be extremely zealous defenders of the ad-
versary system. It has been suggested that this posture is one kind of defense mecha-
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Resistance of a general kind has already surfaced toward the new
Rules. Some lawyers believe that the current Code is sufficient and
can be expected to oppose any substantial change in the status
quo. 117 To some extent, this reaction may reflect the conservative in-
stincts of the legal profession-a belief that the fundamental ethical
precepts of the profession do not, or at least ought not, change each
decade.
But developments taking place as this article goes to press make
it clear that a substantial number of lawyers are unmitigatedly hostile
towards the proposed Rules and have objections to it which are
highly specific and emphatic. Beginning in June 1980, yet another
proposed ethics code, "The American Lawyer's Code of Conduct"
[American Code] 118 was publicly disseminated. Drafted by the
Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyers Foundation under the re-
portage of Monroe Freedman, this document is clearly intended as a
response and a counterweight to the Model Rules. 119 In breadth of
coverage, the American Code is not as comprehensive a document.
But as to the issues I have been addressing, lawyer-client confiden-
tiality, loyalty to client interests and adversary zealousness on behalf
of clients, it is a ringing reaffirmation of the adversary system,
nism needed by lawyers to reduce the psychological pain of representing clients known
to be guilty or who wish to commit unfair acts toward others. See Kelso & Kelso, Con-
flict, Emotion and Legal Ethics, 10 PAC. L. REv. 69, 79-80 (1979). Whatever its source,
it is a viewpoint which will have to be reckoned with as the Rules are debated.
117. Hostility toward the idea of a new code surfaced as early as 1977 when the
drafting commission was formed. See LIEBERMAN, supra note 14, at 217. Since the
Rules were disseminated in February 1980, a new wave of opposition has emerged. For
example, at a day-long public hearing on the new rules recently held in New York City,
spokesmen for the New York State Bar Association, the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, and the New York County Lawyers Association unanimously rejected
the concept of a completely rewritten Code. "When you have this kind of dramatic
change in form as well as substance," said the President of the New York State Bar As-
sociation, "the burden of proof is on those proposing the change to show why we need
it." Note, Bar Groups Oppose Revisory Code of Ethics, N.Y.L.J., May 6, 1980, at 1,
col. 2.
118. THE AMERICAN LAVYER'S CODE OF CONDUCr (Discussion Draft, June 1980).
119. Both the introduction and preface to the American Lawyer's Code of Conduct
are highly critical of the Model Rules. For example, the introduction, written by
Theodore Koskoff, President of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, takes the
Rules to task for "erod[ing] basic constitutional protections by making the lawyer the
agent of the State, not the champion of the client, in many important respects." Id. at Iii.
And the preface by Irwin Birnbaum, the chairman of the drafting committee, is even
more direct: "Unfortunately, the Model Rules make few improvements over the CPR; in
several significant respects, they are inferior to it. With all its serious flaws, the Code of
Professional Responsibility is preferable to the Model Rules." Id. at 1.
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repudiating the Rules' proposed concept of "limited advocacy." 120 If
anything, the American Code narrows the Model Code's exceptions
to lawyer-client confidentiality rather than broadens them1 21 and re-
iterates the view that the American system of justice is an adversary
system "because only such a system protects the liberty of the indi-
vidual."'122 Moreover, the structure of this alternative draft is not
given to conciliation and compromise. Like the Model Rules, it is
comprised of highly specific "rules" and "comments." Indeed it goes
one step further than the Model Rules, appending at the end of each
section "illustrative cases" which supply a great deal of detail and par-
ticularity to its sometimes highly controversial proposals. 12
120. The Rules' concept of limited advocacy is most clearly expressed in Rule 1.5(b),
which, subject to principles of informed consent, advises that "a lawyer may decline to
pursue a course of action on behalf of a client that the lawyer considers repugnant or
imprudent although in conformity with law .... " In contrast, in a section entitled "Fi-
delity to the Client's Interests," the American Code admonishes the lawyer to "give un-
divided fidelity to the client's interests as perceived by the client, unaffected by any
interest of the lawyer or of any other person, or by the lawyer's perception of the public
interest" THE AaEmPCAN LAWYE'S CODE OF CONDUCT, Rule 2.1. Similarly, the com-
ments to the American Code's sections on zealousness state that "[o]nce the lawyer is
committed to represent a client.., the lawyer has no discretion, short of grounds for
withdrawal, to fail to provide the client with every legal recourse that is consistent with
the retainer agreement, reasonably available, and in the client's interests as the client
perceives them."
121. The drafters of the American Code were divided on the question of what excep-
tions should be permitted to the rule of lawyer-client confidentiality. Accordingly, two
alternative drafts are presented. Both alternatives are as a whole more protective of
lawyer-client confidentiality than either the Code or the Model Rules. "Alternative A"
of the American Code permits disclosure of confidences (but does not require it): first,
under compulsion of law (but only after good faith efforts to test the validity of the law),
second, in cases involving imminent danger to life, third, to avoid proceeding before a
corrupted judge or juror and fourth, to defend the lawyer or his associates from "form-
ally instituted charges" of misconduct. "Alternative B" is even narrower, omitting the
second and third exceptions. Both alternatives reject the Code's formulation, permitting
violation of confidentiality in cases of "future (or continuing) crimes." See THE ARmfi-
CAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT, Pt. 1, The Client's Trusts and Confidences, at
101-10. Compare the Code, DR 4-101(C) and the Model Rules, 1.7, 3.1.
122. Introduction to THE A ERICAN LAWYER's CODE OF CONDUCT at ii. (Discussion
Draft, June 1980).
123. For the sake of familiarity, consider the American Code's resolution of the lying
client problem, contained in Illustration 1(j):
A lawyer learns from a client during the trial of a civil or criminal case that
the client intends to give testimony that the lawyer knows to be false. The law-
yer reasonably believes that a request for leave to withdraw would be denied
andlor would be understood by the judge and by opposing counsel as an indica-
tion that the testimony is false. The lawyer does not seek leave to withdraw,
presents the client's testimony in the ordinary manner, and refers to it in sum-
mation as evidence in the case. The lawyer has not committed a disciplinary vi-
olation.
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One can only speculate as to what set of rules will emerge from
full debate of these proposals and counterproposals. But considering
the similar structure of these documents, the radically different views
of the adversary system which they represent and the apparent reluc-
tance of the Rules' drafters expressly to sanction the exercise of indi-
vidual discretion in this area, it is doubtful that these two proposals
can be effectively compromised. Failing a compromise, it may well
be that the basic ideas of the Model Rules will prevail. Trial lawyers,
after all, constitute a minority of the American legal profession and
their commitment to the adversary ideal is not necessarily shared by
the majority of American lawyers. It is therefore plausible, even
likely, that they will be unable to resist the Rules' and the profes-
sion's new directions.
Or possibly, a compromise might be reached-a decision to re-
tain the basic format of the Code of Professional Responsibility and to
incorporate within it some of the less controversial and disruptive
recommendations of each of the two drafting committees. From this
writer's perspective, that would not be such an unfortunate resolu-
tion. There is much to be said for the view that the Model Rules'
drafting commission has exceeded its charge, that the radical changes
it has proposed, not only as to the structure of the present Code but
as to its basic substance, are unnecessarily disruptive to orderly de-
velopments in the field of legal ethics, inviting equally extreme re-
sponses. There is also something to be said for the proposition that
the inconsistencies and ambiguities of the Code have served an ex-
tremely useful function. Thomas Hardy said that the British Constitu-
tion owed much of its success in practice to its inconsistencies in
principle.'2A The Code's ambiguities in defining the proper limits of
the adversary function reflect to a great extent the ambivalence of
American lawyers. No matter, therefore, what one's views are about
the adversary system or the lawyer's proper role within it, the Code
has thus far successfully avoided what must surely be an unhappy
resolution-the imposition by majority rule of categorical imperatives,
of rigid "shalls" and "shall nots" in a sensitive field, upon a deeply di-
vided profession.
124. T. HARDY, THE HAND OF ETHELBERTA 80 (1905).
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